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Abstract
Household migration can affect labor market opportunities differently for the two
spouses, both because of gender-specific differences between the skills of migrants
and the skills that are in demand in the host country, and because of differences
in the extent of gender-based labor market discrimination between the country of
origin and the host country. Standard bargaining theory suggests that, if household
migration leads to a comparative improvement in labor market opportunities for
married women, it should be beneficial to them. We show that, if renegotiation
possibilities for migrant women are limited, the opposite may be true, particularly
if women are specialized in household activities and the labor market allows more
flexibility in their labor supply choices. Evidence from the German Socio-Economic
Panel indeed shows that, holding everything else constant, improvements in relative
wages for migrant women do not translate into better outcomes for them.
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1 Introduction
One of the concerns often raised in the debate about globalization is that, even if it
may produce economic benefits from an aggregate perspective, it may leave behind
some categories of individuals—precisely those already facing adverse economic cir-
cumstances. In particular, some of the voices speaking against globalization (e.g. mem-
bers of transnational feminist networks, such as the US-based International Associa-
tion for Feminist Economics or the EU-based Network Women in Development) have
stressed gender-specific concerns. Such concerns are particularly acute in the case of in-
ternational migration, which is one of the most significant facets of globalization:1 “[...]
female migrants continue to be particularly vulnerable to gender-based discrimination.
Stated very simply, the problems faced by migrant women are compounded by their
being both women and migrants” (Moreno-Fontes, 2002).
In this paper, we examine the intra-household distributional effects of international
economic migration. There are several channels through which migration can have dif-
ferential effects across genders. In particular, family relocation tends to affect labor
market opportunities differently for the two spouses, both because of gender-specific
differences between the skills of migrants and the skills that are in demand in the host
country, and because of differences in the extent of gender-based labor market discrim-
ination between the country of origin and the host country. Moreover, since women
are still more centrally involved in childrearing, any migration-related changes in child-
care opportunities (e.g. separation from family members with whom childcare can be
shared) would affect men and women differently.
Migration, however, is not an exclusively individual choice: individuals typically
belong to a household, and the decision to migrate and take advantage of improved
market opportunities is a collective choice that affects all household members.2 Thus,
for migrant couples, gender-specific outcomes do not just depend on the direct effects
that migration produces on each spouse, but also on how these effects translate into
intra-household bargaining outcomes.
1The number of international migrants has grown steadily in the past four decades to an estimated
175 million in 2000—49% of whom were women (United Nations, 2004). Most people migrate, either
temporarily or permanently, from poorer countries to take advantage of opportunities in richer countries.
For example, hourly manufacturing earnings in Mexico (not PPP-adjusted) are on average 10% of the
corresponding earnings in the United States (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics).
2The first to stress that spouses might be “tied” in their relocation decisions was Mincer (1978).
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In our analysis, we focus on the differential effects that migration generates across
spouses through changes in their labor market opportunities and hence in their relative
wages. Since much of the economic migration we observe worldwide takes place from
countries where gender-based labor market discrimination is more acute to countries
where there is more wage equality between genders,3 there is a presumption that female
migrants should on average experience a relative wage improvement compared to their
husbands. Standard bargaining models of marriage that abstract from commitment (e.g.
Becker, 1974; McElroy and Horney, 1981; Bourguignon and Chiappori, 1992) predict
that such an improvement should increase women’s bargaining strength and hence be
beneficial to them. Thus, at first sight, economic theory seems to suggest that, although
migration can produce differential effects across genders, these effects should not per
se adversely affect female migrants. On the contrary, moving to a country where their
labor market opportunities improve relative to their husbands’ should empower migrant
women vis-a`-vis their partners, enabling them to experience comparatively larger gains.
However, economic theory also suggests that, in the context of a long-term contrac-
tual relationship, it may be ex-ante efficient to limit renegotiation possibilities in order
to prevent partners to renege ex post on what was an ex-ante optimal course of ac-
tion. To counter the adverse effects of renegotiation, couples will then typically rely on
mechanisms that achieve long-run commitment—such as formal marriage arrangements
sanctioned by legal institutions and social norms.
The existence of long-term commitment mechanisms that limit renegotiation of the
marriage contract raises the possibility of strongly asymmetric intra-household migra-
tion outcomes. In all cases, migration will be beneficial to all household members in an
ex-ante sense: to the extent that individuals voluntarily enter into a long-run marriage
contract, this must produce an ex-ante Pareto gain; the possibility of migration would be
accounted for ex ante and would simply expand the overall ex-ante expected surplus.
Yet, under certain realizations, household surplus may be distributed very unequally
across household members; and to the extent that there exist systematic gender asym-
metries within households—arising from traditional gender roles and gender-based la-
bor market discrimination—we could expect that there may be a systematic gender gap
in migration outcomes.
We explore these issues using a simple theoretical model of intra-household bargain-
ing—based on Chen, Conconi, and Perroni (2007)—that is able to generate testable pre-
3Recent empirical studies (surveyed by a 2001 World Bank report) indicate that on average the raw
gender wage gap is smaller in developed countries than in developing countries (World Bank, 2001).
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dictions about the gender-specific distributional impacts of joint migration for married
couples. This is closely related to existing models of intra-household bargaining, but
extends these constructs to account for the possibility of long-run renegotiation-proof
arrangements, as well as migration choices. According to this model, holding every-
thing else constant, the impact of a relative wage increase for a married migrant woman
depends crucially on the extent to which renegotiation is constrained: if the marriage
contract is renegotiable, the wage increase will improve her bargaining position and
thus be beneficial to her; if instead renegotiation is not feasible, she may be adversely
affected, since an ex-ante optimal arrangement may dictate a higher market effort and a
comparatively lower surplus for the spouse who experiences a wage increase.
The extensive literature that has studied migration decisions has shown that individ-
ual migrants are not randomly drawn from the population. Some papers have stressed
self-selection effects based on skill levels, with high-skilled individuals being more likely
to migrate (e.g. Chiswick, 1978; Borjas, 1987); others have focused on selection effects in
terms of risk-attitudes, with migration being more likely the less risk averse individuals
are (Heitmueller, 2005). Our theoretical model of intra-household bargaining suggests
that selection effects could also apply to migrant couples. In particular, a strong marriage
works as an insurance device, effectively making the couple less risk averse. Couples
that can rely on mechanisms that limit renegotiation should thus be more likely to mi-
grate than couples for whom renegotiation possibilities are less limited. In turn, this
selection effect implies that, everything else being the same, migrant women should be
more likely to suffer from an adverse effect of an own-wage increase, since they are
more likely to be in marriage contracts that limit renegotiation.
The model’s predictions are tested using survey data from the German Socio-Econom-
ic Panel (GSOEP). This is a representative longitudinal study of private households in
Germany since 1984, covering both Germans and resident foreign nationals who mi-
grated in the 1960s and early 1970s, as well as recent immigrants. The dataset gives
detailed information for households and household members on a wide range of topics;
most importantly, it includes information specifically related to immigrants.
Our empirical analysis focuses on the relationship between relative wages for mar-
ried migrant women and their reported satisfaction, and, pooling all observations on
all couples over years, tries to uncover the factors that influence this relationship. As
the GSOEP only includes post-migration information, we cannot directly measure the
effects of relative wage changes due to migration. We can nevertheless derive inferences
about these effects by looking at the impact of relative wage changes experienced by the
spouses after they have migrated to Germany. We use two different samples covering the
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period 1984 to 2005: since we are interested in the intra-household effects of migration,
we include in the first sample only those who migrated to Germany as a married couple;
to isolate migration-specific effects, we then combine the previous sample with similar
data for German married couples and compare patterns for Germans and migrants.
The data exhibit a robust pattern for both German and migrant women: a woman’s
share in total household income is negatively related to her reported satisfaction. How-
ever, this effect is significantly stronger for migrant women than it is for German women.
We take this pattern as supportive of the hypothesis that renegotiation opportunities are
particularly weak for migrant women. Our results thus suggest that, although migra-
tion may be beneficial to women, this is not because of the comparative improvement in
their labor market opportunities that is likely to accompany migration: on the contrary,
everything else being the same, comparatively better wages for migrant women may
simply translate into an increase in their market effort, with little relief from household
work.
These findings are in line with the sociological studies that have commented on the
role of gender in migration and have stressed the importance of traditional gender roles
within households, which lead women to bear the “double burden” of market work
plus household work: “Participation in the labor force does not automatically improve
equality between a migrant and her husband. For some migrant women, labor force
participation may increase the burden that they must carry unless they find new alter-
natives to old roles, particularly those of childcare and housework” (Boyd and Grieco,
2003).
2 Theory
In this section we outline a simple theoretical framework that delivers predictions about
the relationship between the characteristics of the marriage contract and the intra-house-
hold distributional effects of migration.
2.1 Renegotiation and Wages
The discussion in this subsection builds on the two-period model of sequential intra-
household bargaining and renegotiation described by Chen, Conconi, and Perroni (2007).
Implications for migration outcomes are discussed in the next subsection.
Consider a given household with two spouses, denoted by A and B. Each spouse
i = A, B has a total time endowment equal to unity, which can be used for market
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activities (li), or leisure (hi = 1− li). Each individual is characterized by a given market
productivity, wi (the market wage rate). Utility of spouse i depends on consumption, ci,
and leisure, hi:
U(ci, hi), (1)
where U is strictly concave (reflecting risk aversion), and where
cA + cB = wAlA + wBlB. (2)
Suppose that the only uncertainty the couple faces is about ex-post market wage
outcomes. At time 0, before a certain wage state s with market wages wA(s),wB(s), and
probability pi(s) is realized, the spouses enter into a contract specifying consumption
and leisure levels, ci(s) and hi(s), in each possible state. Focusing on the case of utilitar-
ian bargaining, ex-ante choices will be aimed at maximizing the additively linear ex-ante
bargaining objective
EUA + EUB, (3)
with
EUi ≡∑
s
pi(s)Ui
(
ci(s), hi(s)
)
, i = A, B, (4)
subject to
EUi ≥ EUi, i = A, B, (5)
where EUi is expected utility for spouse i outside the marriage. Note that, under this
specification, optimal choices are fully separable across states, implying that the ex-ante
optimal choices for state s coincide with the solution to the problem of maximizing
UA
(
cA(s), hA(s)
)
+UB
(
cB(s), hB(s)
)
. (6)
After a given state is realized (at time 1), however, the spouses can renegotiate the
terms of the agreement. The ex-post renegotiation outcome in state s is the solution to
the problem of maximizing
UA
(
cA(s), hA(s)
)
+UB
(
cB(s), hB(s)
)
(7)
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subject to the resource constraint (2) for state s
Ui
(
ci(s), hi(s)
)
≥ u¯i(s)− µi, i = A, B, (8)
where u¯A(s) and u¯B(s) are the values of outside options in state s—which are positively
related respectively to wA(s) and to wB(s) (i.e. du¯i(s)/dwi(s) > 0)4—and the µ’s are
nonnegative parameters that capture the extent of the costs for rematching for each
spouse. Let the solution to the above problem be denoted by c˜i(s), h˜i(s), i = A, B, and
let u˜i(s) ≡ Ui (c˜i(s), h˜i(s)). Note that if the µ’s are very large, such solution will be
insensitive to changes in the outside options.
Then, at time 0, taking ex-post renegotiation into account, the spouses will select
actions for all states in order to maximize (6) subject to the resource constraints (2) for
each state s and to the no-renegotiation constraints
Ui
(
ci(s), hi(s)
)
≥ u˜i(s)− λi, i = A, B, ∀s, (9)
where the λ’s are nonnegative renegotiation penalties that must be incurred by each
party for reneging on the course of action previously agreed upon. If utility is con-
cave in its arguments, then any ex-ante opportunity (arising from positive renegotiation
penalties) to tie down ex-post choices will be exploited to achieve smoothing of out-
comes across states (i.e., insurance).
When the λ’s are zero, this problem degenerates into a set of unlinked ex-post bar-
gaining problems and no ex-ante agreement is feasible (as in Lundberg and Pollak,
2003). When the values of the λ’s become larger, ex-ante bargaining can prescribe
choices which guarantee ex-post joint utility levels at future nodes that deviate from
those resulting from ex-post optimal renegotiation choices, thus securing a higher ex-
ante expected payoff. As the λ’s approach infinity, full ex-ante commitment becomes
feasible, and renegotiation possibilities have no influence on choices. In this framework,
any change in the economic environment that affects the value of the outside option,
u¯i(s), i = A, B, will only have an effect on bargained outcomes if the values of the λ’s
and the µ’s are not too large.
When the λ’s and the µ’s are small enough that both (8) and (9) are binding, an
individual’s welfare will always be positively related to his or her outside option and
therefore to his or her wage (i.e. dui(s)/dwi(s) = du¯i(s)/dwi(s) > 0), implying that a
4The value of the outside option, u¯i(s), in each state results from a matching equilibrium in the mar-
riage market—a process which we need not explicitly model here, but which will always have the property
that a higher wage results in a (weakly) better match outcome for the individual involved.
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comparative improvement in a spouse’s market position will always result in a compar-
ative improvement for her. This is the standard prediction that a bargaining framework
would generate in the absence of pre-commitment mechanisms and frictions.
In the opposite extreme case of no renegotiation, with the λ’s and/or µ’s approach-
ing infinity, the ex-ante problem degenerates into the maximization of (6) subject to (2).
Adopting a dual representation of preferences, we can represent this as the maximiza-
tion, by choice of utility levels uA and uB (omitting s for simplicity) of uA + uB subject
to the resource constraint
EA(wA, uA) + EB(wB, uB) = wA + wB, (10)
where Ei(wi, ui) is a strictly convex expenditure function (strict convexity reflecting risk
aversion)—a function of prices (the opportunity cost of leisure, wi, and of the price of
consumption, equal to unity) and of the utility level. Totally differentiating (10) with
respect to uA, uB and wA, while at the same time adjusting wB so as to hold household
earnings constant we obtain a relationship between changes in wA and wB that leave the
budget unchanged:
dwB
dwA
= −E
A
w − 1
EBw − 1
= − l
A
lB
. (11)
As shown in Chen, Conconi, and Perroni (2007), by combining (11) with the first-order
conditions for an optimum one can derive an expression for the compensated effect on
utility of a wage change:
duA
dwA
wA
uA
= −w
AEBu
uAlB
EAuwlB + EBuwlA
EAuuEBu + EBuuEAu
< 0. (12)
Thus, if renegotiation is not feasible, a compensated increase in the relative earning
power of a household member will adversely affect that individual. This is because it is
ex-ante efficient to prescribe that individuals with comparatively higher earning power
should work more; and since consumption and leisure are complements—implying that
the marginal utility of consumption is comparatively lower for individuals working
more—and to the extent that individuals are not too risk-averse ex ante, higher effort
should not be compensated with higher consumption.
This adverse effect will be larger in absolute value the less risk-averse the individuals
are: risk aversion means that individuals will not find it optimal ex ante to commit to
a choice dictating strongly asymmetric intra-household outcomes in some realizations.
This can be seen by focusing on the following constant-relative-risk-aversion/constant-
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elasticity-of-substitution specification:
U(ci, hi) =
1
1− ρ
(
(1− θ)1/σ(ci)(σ−1)/σ + θ1/σ(hi)(σ−1)/σ
)(1−ρ)σ/(σ−1)
, (13)
where σ is the elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure (constant in
this specification), θ is a labor share parameter, and ρ is the coefficient of relative risk
aversion (also constant). Then, for wA = wB = 1 (and lA = lB = l = 1− θ), we have(
dui
dwi
wi
ui
)
wA=wB=1
= −θ 1− ρ
ρ
. (14)
The negative effect of a compensated own-wage increase is decreasing in the degree of
risk aversion, ρ.5
Under full commitment, comparative specialization by women in household produc-
tion, in conjunction with institutional constraints on labor supply, will tend to make this
negative own-wage effect comparatively larger for women. Other things equal, intra-
household specialization reduces the labor market supply of a woman relative to that
of her husband: if, for example, we model specialization as a reduction in a woman’s
(spouse A’s) total time available for market work and leisure from 1 to 1− k (where
k represents homework), then for wA = wB an optimum implies lA < lB. Individu-
als engaged in full-time market activities have typically little scope for adjusting their
level of labor supply at the margin, whereas part-time workers enjoy more working-
hours flexibility.6 On the other hand, lower bounds on working hours may prevent
part-time working women from making marginal downward labor supply adjustments
in response to a comparative reduction in their wage.
As shown in Chen, Conconi and Perroni (2007), under full commitment by both
spouses asymmetries in the welfare effects of relative wage changes—with wives being
more likely to suffer from an own-wage increase compared to their husbands—can arise
from a combination of traditional gender roles and institutional labor market constraints.
In cases of less-than-full commitment, asymmetric welfare effects across genders can
5For ρ > 1 we have U < 0, and so a positive elasticity implies a negative effect, which then becomes
increasing in ρ.
6Recent empirical labor literature (e.g. Stewart and Swaffield, 1997) has stressed the importance of
institutional constraints on hours worked. Bonin et al. (2003) focus on the German labor market and
find that the own-wage elasticity regarding participation and hours worked is positive for both men and
women but is larger for wives than for husbands. The empirical link between gender-based specialization,
employment status, and labor supply elasticities is documented in Blundell et al. (2000).
8
also arise because of systematic differences in rematching costs and/or renegotiation
costs across genders. These asymmetries could, for example, derive from the greater
involvement by women in childrearing, which makes it harder for women with children
to remarry.
Summarizing, a spouse is more likely to experience an adverse effect from a com-
pensated own-wage increase the stronger is commitment to the marriage. Moreover,
within-household specialization, labor market constraints and asymmetries in the de-
gree of rematching and renegotiation costs imply that such a scenario is more likely for
women than for men.
2.2 Migration
Although our previous analysis does not specifically refer to migration, it can be applied
to obtain predictions about migration outcomes.
Consider the following formalization of migration choices under full commitment.
Suppose that at time 0 the couple faces an irreversible migration opportunity, and that
both spouses must agree to it—i.e. each spouse can individually veto it. There are
S states corresponding to different wage realizations (in either the origin country or
the destination country) for potential migrants: a subset, SM, of these states represents
wage realizations that can be taken advantage of only upon migration; whereas the
subset SN represents possible realizations in the country of origin. Let then ÊUi(SN)
represent the expected utility for i with no migration, resulting from the solution of a
bargaining problem as previously described. Also, suppose that each individual incurs
a migration cost φ. Then the migration choice can be formalized as the maximization of
the with-migration bargaining objective
EUA(SM) + EUB(SM), (15)
subject to the relevant post-migration no-renegotiation constraints and to
EUi(SM) ≥ ÊUi(SN) + φ, i = A, B. (16)
If the above problem has a feasible solution (i.e. if the feasible set defined by (16) is
non-empty), migration will take place.
When the variation in post-migration outcomes is greater than that in pre-migration
outcomes—i.e. migration is riskier than non-migration—then (16) is more likely to be
satisfied the less risk averse individuals are. What this implies is that the migrant cou-
ples we observe will not be randomly selected with respect to their characteristics: other
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things equal, migrants are more likely to be low-risk-aversion individuals. This is in line
with evidence suggesting that migrants are likely to be less risk averse than the average
non-migrant population (e.g. Heitmueller, 2005).
Notice that in our framework commitment to the marriage can act as an insurance
device for spouses facing a (comparatively riskier) migration option. Thus, for the same
degree of risk aversion, individuals who can rely on mechanisms that limit renegotiation
should be more likely to migrate than couples for whom renegotiation possibilities are
less limited.
Finally, if migration is to a country where the outside options are comparatively
more favorable to women, then the post-migration no-renegotiation constraint (equation
(16) above) is more likely to be binding for women than for men; in turn, this implies
that migrant couples should be those for which rematching and renegotiation costs are
particularly high for the woman.
Combining the above predictions concerning the self-selection of migrants with the
results of our previous discussion, we can immediately draw the implication that mi-
grant women should be comparatively more likely to experience adverse effects than
non-migrants; this is because they should belong to less risk averse and more commit-
ment-prone households (and possibly more so for the female than for the male spouse),
implying more adverse effects of a compensated improvement in their relative wages.7
To summarize the conclusions from our discussion in this section: to the extent that
marriage is open to renegotiation, we should expect that migration to a country that
offers comparatively better labor market opportunities for women should improve their
relative position within households. If, however, renegotiation opportunities are limited
by institutional mechanisms that achieve long-term commitment, then a relative increase
in a woman’s earning position may not help her, as it may result in increased market
and household effort without having any relevant impact on her bargaining strength.
We should also expect an own relative wage increase to be more likely to affect women
7In our discussion of migration choices we have shown that commitment can limit the spouses’ ability
to veto specific migration opportunities; we have thus neglected the possibility that pre-commitment may
limit a spouse’s ability to veto migration in general. In other words, before a specific migration prospect
materializes, the couple may find it optimal to pre-commit to take advantage of any joint migration
opportunities that may arise, even if this means violating (16) in some realizations, i.e. even if it means
lowering the continuation expected utility of one of the two spouses. This adds yet another reason for
expecting migrants to be comparatively more commitment prone.
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adversely in comparison with men, because women are more involved in household
production and hence in part-time market work—which allows more labor supply flex-
ibility at the margin. Finally, we should expect migrant women to be more likely to
experience adverse effects, because they are more likely to belong to households charac-
terized by strong commitment and low risk aversion.
3 Data
This section describes the dataset and samples we use for our estimation, as well as the
variables involved.
3.1 Dataset
We rely on a dataset from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), a yearly survey-
based representative longitudinal study of private households in Germany since 1984.
Germany has been by far the most popular European destination country for emigrants
in last fifty years; almost 9% of the German population is foreign born (OECD, 2003).
The survey collects information on all household members, including Germans liv-
ing in the old and new German La¨nder, Ethnic Germans who migrated in mass from
Eastern countries after the Second World War, foreigners who have entered the country
in the 1960s and early 1970s, and more recent immigrants to Germany. In 1994/1995
an additional subsample of 500 immigrant households was included in the dataset to
capture the massive inflow of immigrants of the late 1980s. The dataset covers a wide
range of topics including household composition, employment, earnings, health, etc.
Most importantly for our purposes, the survey contains specific information related to
immigrant couples, such as year of migration and marital status upon migration.8
Unfortunately, although the GSOEP contains very detailed information about mi-
grant households, it does not includes pre-migration information. Therefore, we cannot
directly study the effect of relative wage changes due to migration on spouses’ satis-
faction and the selection bias effects predicted by our theory. We can, however, derive
inferences about the intra-household effects of changes in labor market opportunities by
8It should be stressed that the GSOEP, being a survey of resident private households, is not represen-
tative of illegal immigrants (who have no official residence) and asylum seekers (who tend to reside in
institutionalised housing).
11
focusing on relative wage changes that have occurred after the spouses have migrated
together to Germany.
We use two different samples covering the period 1984 to 2005 (the most recent avail-
able data): since we are interested in the intra-household effects of migration, we include
in the first sample only those who migrated to Germany as a married couple. Those cou-
ples are selected using information about their year of marriage and their year of migra-
tion to Germany. This means that we exclude from the analysis all second-generation
migrants (who were born in Germany but do not have the German nationality), those
who migrated single or got married with German nationals.
When constructing the first sample, we drop those immigrants originating from other
industrialized countries, as we want to focus our analysis on couples who migrated from
countries where wages and labor market conditions are significantly different from those
in Germany.9 We know that gender-based wage discrimination patterns are markedly
different between Germany and the countries of origin as well as across countries of
origin.10 We also know that there exist significant gender-specific differences between
the skills of migrants and the skills that are in demand in the host country.11 It is
therefore likely that, upon migration, many of the women in our sample would have
experienced significant changes in their relative wages compared to their husbands.
The second sample combines the previous sample with similar data for German
married couples, who are selected using information on the year of their first marriage
and are still together today. By using the combined sample, we are able to compare
patterns for Germans and migrants, thus isolating migration-specific effects.
9We thus exclude migrants from all other European Union countries as well as from the United States,
Switzerland, Japan, Australia and Canada.
10According to Blau and Kahn (2003), the average gender wage gap in Germany is less than 20%,
whereas in Turkey the estimated wage gap is about 50% (Selim and Ipek, 2002). Moreover, according to
a report by the World Economic Forum (WEF), which ranks nations on five criteria, including equal pay
and access to jobs, Turkey is in the bottom ten countries for gender equality, while Germany is in the top
ten countries. In contrast, Eastern (and Southern) European economies are seemingly characterized by a
lower extent of gender-based wage discrimination. This observation, however, could be consistent with
the presence of gender-based occupational discrimination, i.e. women being underrepresented in high-
paying occupations that are characterized by comparatively greater gender-based wage discrimination
(Olivetti and Petrongolo, 2005).
11For example, in many sectors (e.g. childcare and elderly care, domestic work, work in restaurants,
hotels and manufacturing clothing companies) demand for female migrant workers far outweights the
demand for male migrant workers (see United Nations, 2005).
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[Tables 1 and 2 here]
As can be seen from Table 1, about 16% of all migrant couples to Germany are from
Poland and ex-Yugoslavia, 15% from Russia and 14% from Turkey, with most of the
others coming from Eastern European countries. Pooling all couples over all years, we
end up with a total of 5,627 available observations, of which 910 (which correspond to
144 individuals) refer to Polish couples and 785 (corresponding to 127 individuals) refer
to Turkish couples. By cross-referencing individual records, we are able to construct a
dataset for 393 couples who migrated jointly from poorer countries (see Table 2).12 The
extended dataset further includes 4,443 German couples.
3.2 Variables and Estimation
The names and definitions of the variables used in our regressions are listed in Table 3.
To capture migration outcomes for women, we focus on self-reported satisfaction—our
dependent variable. This is measured as the response to the following survey question:
“How satisfied are you with your life today, all things considered?”; it ranges from 0
(completely dissatisfied) to 10 (completely satisfied). This is a subjective measure of
utility, since people are asked to evaluate their level of well-being with regard to actual
and past experience, and in comparison to others. For a thorough discussion of this
measure, see Frey and Stutzer (2002).13
[Table 3 here]
The use of self-reported satisfaction in empirical work has been widely criticized
on the grounds that people’s subjective assessments are unreliable. As a result, cross-
sectional regressions on happiness are usually thought of as being biased whenever
unobservable characteristics, such as a person’s innate cheerfulness, are correlated with
12Note that Table 1 reports an odd number of individuals for some countries of origin (column 3). This
is because the spouses of some migrant couples do not always hold the same nationality (e.g. the wife
originates from Russia and her husband from Georgia).
13This measure raises a difficult question of interpretation. Namely, when comparing across respon-
dents, should this be interpreted as reflecting a subjective ranking within the whole population or as
reflecting a subjective ranking within a peer group with which the individual identifies? In the latter
interpretation, reported changes should be taken as relative utility changes (∆u/u) rather than absolute
changes (∆u).
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observed variables included in the regressions, such as education. One advantage of the
GSOEP lies in its panel structure, as the same people can be followed over time. Panel
regressions can therefore be estimated, with a separate dummy variable included for
each person in the sample. This allows to overcome the bias that is suspected to affect
cross-sectional regressions.14
The explanatory variable of interest is a spouse’s relative wage, measured as the ratio
of the respondent’s wage (per hour) and of the sum of the two spouses’ hourly wage,
denoted by Wage share. This is meant both as a measure of comparative bargaining
strength and as a measure of the spouse’s potential contribution to household income.
Our dataset contains information on monthly gross earnings (including overtime pay)
and on the number of hours worked per week during the last month. The wage we
calculate for each spouse is thus gross monthly earnings divided by the number of hours
worked per week, further divided by 4.3 to obtain gross earnings per hour (Dustmann
and van Soest, 1997).
As stressed before, the above variables only capture post-migration outcomes. Thus,
we cannot directly measure the effects of relative wage changes which have occurred
upon migration. Our methodology is thus to derive inferences based on the effects of
relative wage changes experienced by migrant couples after moving to Germany. We
then pool all observations on all married couples over years, and investigate the effects
of within-household relative wage differentials on self-reported satisfaction by men and
women.
The regressions include a number of controls which refer to (standard) individual
characteristics considered in the “happiness” literature (see, among others, Ferrer-i-
Carbonell and Frijters, 2004): age, age squared, years of education, and health status
of the respondent and of his/her spouse. We also include various household character-
istics: household income, number of household members, number of children, a dummy
for having children and a dummy for having young children (less than ten years old).
The income measure we use is total annual household income. This variable is prob-
ably a better measure of economic well-being than monthly household income since
it includes irregular income components such as Christmas bonuses etc. In order to
14Clark and Oswald (2002) compare panel to cross-sectional regressions of happiness and find that
the results obtained from using both methodologies are very similar, suggesting that the bias in cross-
sectional analysis may not be as severe as expected. In this paper, we report results of panel regressions.
We also ran the same regressions in cross-section, i.e. excluding person fixed effects, and the main results
remained unchanged.
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compare income over time, household income is deflated to 2000 prices. Year, German
La¨nder and individual fixed effects are also included in all regressions. As we estimate
panel regressions, we drop individual characteristics that do not vary over time.
The theoretical analysis presented in Sections 2-3 above gives rise to the following set
of predictions: (i) women are more likely to be affected adversely than men following a
(compensated) increase in their relative wages, both because they are more involved in
household production and in part-time work—implying more flexibility in their labor
market responses—and because they tend to face higher rematching and renegotiation
costs; (ii) the sign and magnitude of the welfare effects of a comparative own-wage
improvement depend on the extent of commitment to the original marriage contract; in
turn, this depends on the size of the renegotiation and rematching costs incurred by the
spouses; (iii) migrant women should be more likely to experience adverse effects than
German women, because they are more likely to belong to households characterized by
low risk aversion and strong commitment, and to face a heavier work burden at home.
To test the first prediction, we interact the explanatory variable ln Wage share with a
female dummy, denoted by Fem, to detect whether women are indeed more negatively
affected than men by an improvement in their relative wages.
To test the second prediction, we interact female relative wages with three sets of
variables. The first set of variables are meant to capture the degree of intra-household
commitment. This is to verify that the extent to which spouses can renegotiate the
terms of their marriage contract affects the relationship between relative wages and self-
reported satisfaction. Two of these variables relate to social norms limiting the extent of
renegotiation (the λ’s in the theoretical model described above). The first is attendance to
religious events (denoted by Religion)15—since this may be positively related to religious
and cultural sanctions associated with marriage. To distinguish between different types
of religion, we also compute a dummy variable for non-Christian faiths, denoted by
Non Christian.16 The second variable capturing social norms is denoted by Enclave and
15This variable is derived from the answer to the following survey question: “How often do you go to
church or attend religious events?”
16The dummy is equal to one for countries of origin where the main religion is non-Christian and zero
otherwise. Note that the GSOEP also asks individuals about their belonging to a religious community.
The answers provided only allow us to identify Christian faiths, and unfortunately, this question is only
asked in 1990, 1997 and 2003. As a robustness check, we computed the correlation between the dummy
for being from a non-Christian country of origin and the dummy for belonging to a Christian community;
as expected, this correlation is negative but small (equal to -0.13).
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tells us if there are other foreigners living in the same neighborhood as the respondent
(although we do not know if they are of the same nationality or not). The other two
commitment variables relate to the extent of rematching costs. These include Age and
the one associated with young children (less than four years of age), denoted by #Child
04.17
Notice that all variables are expressed in such a way that an increase in the value
of the variable indicates stronger commitment (i.e. stricter social norms and higher
rematching costs).
In order to verify whether a possible adverse effect of a relative wage increase for
a woman is associated with an increase in her labor market effort, we also interact the
female wage share with three variables that are meant to capture the degree of flexibility
of labor supply responses. To measure flexibility on the extensive margin, we construct
a variable, denoted by Full-time, capturing changes from part-time to full-time work
status that are positively associated with wage increases. To measure flexibility on the
intensive margin, we use Overtime work—measured as the weekly number of overtime
hours divided by the number of hours “agreed” with the employer. We also use the
variable Flex, which is defined as the ratio of agreed working hours to desired hours as
reported by the respondents (for a more detailed description of these variables, see the
next subsection).
The last set of interactions used to test prediction (ii) above are meant to capture
the extent of the burden of household work carried by married women. These include
the following five variables: absence of nearby relatives, captured by a dummy if the
migrants did not have any family living in Germany prior to moving, denoted by No
Family; a variable stating how often people visit family and relatives or receive visits
(No Visits); the variable No Cleaner, capturing that external household help is never
used; and two dummy variables, Until 85 and Until 91, capturing changes in maternity
legislation in Germany.18
17In Germany pre-school is known as “Kindergarten”. Attendance can start at the age of three, but the
vast majority of children only starts Kindergarten at the age of four (e.g. Spiess et al., 2003; Ondrich and
Spiess, 1998).
18In Germany, maternity leave legislation consists of three parts: maternity protection, protected ma-
ternity leave, and maternity benefits (see Schonberg and Ludsteck, 2006). In 1986 and 1992 important
changes were introduced in the legislation, making it more favorable to women: since 1986, all mothers
receive maternity benefits for at least six months, regardless of their employment status before birth; since
1992, women are entitled to a total of three years of protected leave. The entitlement to these benefits
follows the principle of territoriality. The parent’s and the child’s place of residence or usual stay in Ger-
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To test the prediction that migrant women are more likely to be negatively affected by
a relative improvement in their labor market opportunities compared to German women
(prediction (iii) above) we introduce an interaction between the female wage share and
the dummy variable Migrants. We then interact female relative wages for migrant and
German women with some of the household and individual characteristics (e.g. degree
of religiosity and type of religion of the respondent, availability of family and external
help at home) to explore the reasons behind the different effects observed for migrant
women.
Note that some of those variables are used both as interactions and as controls.19
The correlation matrix for the controls included in the regressions is reported in Table 4
below.
[Table 4 here]
Tables 5 and 6 give descriptive statistics for some key variables at the household and
individual levels. In comparison with German natives, migrant households are larger
and have lower total incomes; at the individual level, both migrant women and men are
significantly less educated, have lower wages and are more religious (i.e. attend reli-
gious events more frequently). There are some specific differences with respect to men
and women: in comparison with their German counterparts, migrant women report sig-
nificantly lower satisfaction and poorer health; for men, there is no significant difference
in reported satisfaction and health is higher (though only at the 5% level) for migrant
men.
[Tables 5 and 6 here]
many is a precondition for entitlement. Foreign nationals need one of the following residence permits:
for employment purposes, for humanitarian reasons, for spouses, or for family reunification purposes if
the family member has residence in Germany.
19It is not possible to include all variables both as interactions and as controls because not all of them
are available for the same individuals, as indicated by the different number of observations we can use
in each regression. When attempting to include all variables as controls, one is left with no observations.
We have thus proceeded as follows: we have always included the standard control variables used in the
happiness literature (reporting the coefficients for these variables in the lower panel of our regression
tables); whenever we have interacted a variable with ln Wage share, we have also included it as a control
(reporting the coefficient for this variable in the middle panel of our regression tables and the coefficient
for the interaction term in the top panel).
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4 Empirical Findings
Since the dependent variable—self-reported satisfaction—varies between 0 and 10, albeit
discretely, in what follows we present results from OLS estimations. Similar results
are obtained using ordered probit estimations (not reported). In order to account for
the survey design of the data, observations are weighted using sampling weights and
standard errors are adjusted for clustering across voting districts.
4.1 Migrants
We first focus only on those migrant couples in which both spouses work and initially
run a specification that includes, in addition to all the standard controls, the relative
wage share, lnWage share. This allows us to examine the effects of compensated relative
wage changes within migrant households. Notice that, although we cannot directly
control for the source of the variation in relative wages, the inclusion of individual fixed
effects allows us to control for any differences in match quality across individuals, which
could be systematically correlated with wages.
Recall that a standard bargaining model that abstracts from frictions would predict
a positive and significant coefficient for the relative wage share, for both spouses. Con-
trary to this prediction, the coefficient in column 1 of Table 7 below is negative and
significant at the 1% level, suggesting the existence of some renegotiation constraints.
To examine whether the effects differ across genders, in column 2 we distinguish be-
tween female and male migrant spouses and find that the effect is positive for men
but negative for women. This seems to indicate that, holding everything else constant,
improvements in the comparative value of outside options—which are positively asso-
ciated with improvements in relative earning power—may actually be detrimental to
migrant women.
[Table 7 here]
Our theory predicts this finding to be associated with large renegotiation and/or re-
matching costs. Columns 3 to 8 report results for specifications where the female wage
share is interacted with variables that can be thought of as proxies for commitment
(through social norms and/or rematching costs). As belonging to non-Christian faiths
(mainly Islam in the sample) may impose stronger social norms on couples that abide to
their principles, we interact the Non Christian dummy with the wage share for migrant
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women. The coefficient on this interaction is negative and significant (column 3), indi-
cating that stricter social norms associated with being of non-Christian faith worsen the
negative impact of an own-wage improvement on the reported well-being of migrant
women.
The interaction with Religion is negative and significant too (column 4), which cor-
roborates our finding above regarding the effect of belonging to non-Christian faiths.
However, this negative effect of religious attendance appears to be significant for non-
Christian women only (column 5). Enclave effects (column 6) are as expected: belonging
to a more tightly-knit community (endowed with comparatively stronger social norms)
significantly raises the negative impact of an increase in the wage share (and is also
directly associated with lower levels of reported satisfaction).
Columns 7 and 8 of Table 7 report results for specifications where the female wage
share is interacted with variables associated with rematching costs. Estimated coeffi-
cients for these interactions are (mostly) highly significant and tend to have the expected
negative sign. In particular, age worsens the adverse effect of an own-wage improve-
ment for female spouses and so does the number of young children (aged between 0 and
4).20, 21 The other controls included in the regressions tend to have effects as expected.
Individuals in richer households and in good health (both own health and health of the
partner) tend to be more satisfied with their life. Being more educated and having chil-
dren are in most cases not significant in explaining own well-being. Finally, consistently
with the findings of previous literature, the partial correlation between own age and life
satisfaction is U-shaped.
Table 8 reports results for the regressions in which we interact the female wage share
with three variables capturing the degree of labor market flexibility. This is to test the
prediction of our theoretical model that, with weak renegotiation, a negative own-wage
impact should be associated with a positive labor supply adjustment. We separately
look at flexibility on the intensive margin and on the extensive margin. The results of
these estimations indicate that the negative effect experienced by women from a relative
20The empirical literature on marriage has indeed found that rematching costs associated with having
children from a previous marriage can be larger for women, particularly when the children are still young
(e.g. Koo et al., 1984; Duncan and Hoffman, 1985; Bumpass et al., 1990; Chiswick and Lehrer, 1990;
Martinson, 1994).
21One might suspect the number of children to be endogenously determined with reported satisfaction.
We tried to instrument the number of pre-school children by its two-year lagged value and our findings
remained unchanged. The results are available upon request.
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own-wage increase is indeed associated with a positive labor supply adjustment.
[Table 8 here]
In order to capture labor supply adjustments on the extensive margin, we look at
changes in participation from part-time to full-time status that are positively associated
with wage increases.22 When the female wage share is interacted with the variable so
obtained (column 1 of Table 8), we obtain a negative and significant effect, as expected.
To capture labor supply adjustments on the intensive margin, we interact the wage
share variable with the ratio of agreed working hours to desired hours as reported
by respondents (denoted by Flex), which we take as a symptom of lower bounds on
working hours; and with Overtime work, which we take as an indication of the degree
of upward flexibility in marginal labor supply responses. The interaction with Flex
(column 2 of Table 8) is negative and significant (at the 10% only). The interaction with
Overtime (column 3 of Table 8) is negative and significant, suggesting that the adverse
effect of a wage share increase on women’s reported satisfaction is stronger the larger is
the proportion of overtime hours worked.
Finally, our theoretical model predicts that migrant women who are more special-
ized in household activities are more likely to be negatively affected by an improvement
in their relative wages, since this would only exacerbate the double burden of house-
hold and market work they must bear. To test this prediction, we interact the female
wage with variables capturing how involved women are in household activities and how
costly these are (Table 9).
[Table 9 here]
The negative impact of an increase in the wage share for migrant women is stronger
for women who migrated to Germany without any family around (column 1) and who
do not receive regular visits from family and relatives (column 2), a finding that can
be interpreted as reflecting the importance for migrant women of being able to share
the burden of household work with relatives and friends. In column 3, we interact the
22The variable Full-time is constructed as follows: we exploit available information in the GSOEP on (i)
the month of the survey; (ii) whether the spouse worked part-time or full-time in each month of the year;
(iii) the wage in the previous month. This allows us to construct a dummy variable that takes a value of 1
if the spouse switched from part-time to full-time status. We then multiply this dummy with the growth
in wage per hour in the period during which the change in employment status occurred.
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female wage share with the variable that indicates whether external household help is
regularly used or not (No Cleaner). If women indeed suffer from a double burden of
market and household work, then we might expect those women who do not receive ex-
ternal help to report lower levels of satisfaction following a relative own-wage increase.
The interaction with No Cleaner is indeed negative and significant, lending further sup-
port to the above interpretation.
Finally, we investigate whether changes in maternity legislation in Germany have al-
tered the impact of changes in relative wages on women’s reported satisfaction (columns
4-5 of Table 9). As mentioned above, maternity leave legislation has become more gen-
erous for women since 1986—when all mothers were granted maternity benefits for at
least six months—and then again since 1992—when all women were entitled to a total
of three years of protected leave. Results indicate that the negative effect of an own-
wage increase on the well-being of women was stronger before 1992, suggesting that
migrant women may have benefited from the improvement in employment protection,
as this may have alleviated the double burden of household and market work they ex-
perienced.
As a robustness check, we have performed estimations with a sample that also in-
cludes couples where one or both of the two spouses do not work. To do so, we first
predicted the potential hourly wage of the non-working spouses using a standard Heck-
man two-step selection model (Heckman, 1979), using individual health status, number
of children and a dummy for being married as exclusion restrictions. The results (not
reported) are broadly in line with the ones reported here.
4.2 Comparison Between Migrants and Germans
As discussed above, our theoretical model predicts that migrant women should be more
likely to experience adverse effects of an improvement in their labor market opportuni-
ties than German women. This is because self-selection effects in the migration decision
imply that migrant women are more likely to belong to households characterized by low
risk aversion and strong commitment. Also, migrant households might be characterized
by more traditional gender roles and asymmetries in renegotiation and rematching costs
across spouses. This might be particularly the case for migrant couples of Muslim faith
who abide by the principles of Sharia law.
To test this prediction, we run a series of regressions on an extended sample that in-
cludes both migrant couples and German couples where both spouses work (the second
sample). The results are reported in Tables 10-11 below.
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[Tables 10 here]
In Column 1 of Table 10 we introduce an interaction between the female wage share
and the Migrants dummy. The coefficient on the female wage share is negative and
significant, again suggesting that the effect of an own-wage improvement lowers self-
reported satisfaction for women relative to men; however, as expected, this effect is
stronger for migrant women. This seems to indicate that migrant women are indeed
more adversely affected than their German counterparts by a comparative improvement
in their outside options—presumably because their households are characterized by low
risk aversion and strong commitment.
The role of social norms is explored in columns 2-4. In column 2, under the as-
sumption that German women are all Christian, we interact the wage share for migrant
women with the Non Christian dummy; notice that the coefficient on the interaction
term is negative and significant. From this we can calculate the wage share effects for
Christian women (relative to their husbands): these are equal to −0.083 for Germans and
to −0.125 for migrants, the latter not being significantly different from zero. Since the
two coefficients are not statistically different from each other (p-value of 64%), we can
conclude that an own-wage improvement does not affect German and migrant women
differently if they are both Christian. However, when focusing on non-Christian women,
we find that the coefficient for migrants is equal to −1.476 (significant at the 1% level),
which is statistically more negative (at the 1% level) than the effect for German women.
This suggests that belonging to a non-Christian faith, which we suspect to be character-
ized by stronger religious and cultural sanctions associated with marriage, strengthens
the negative relationship between wages and satisfaction for migrant women, both rela-
tive to Christian migrant women and German women.
Columns 3 and 4 provide additional evidence on the role of social norms associated
with religion. Column 3 shows that more frequent attendance to religious services
worsens the own-wage impact for both migrant and German women (both interactions
with Religion are significantly negative). Note, however, that attendance to religious
events has a different effect for migrant and for German women. To see this, notice
that women who never attend (for whom Religion = 1), and therefore may be thought
of as belonging to households characterized by weaker commitment, the effects of an
increase in relative wages on self-reported satisfaction are not statistically different for
German and migrant women (p-value of 86%); for those women, the effects (relative to
their husbands) are respectively equal to −0.238 and to −0.260 (significant at the 1%
and 5% levels, respectively). In contrast, for women who attend religious events on
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a weekly basis (for whom Religion = 4), the effect of a relative wage improvement is
more detrimental to migrant women than it is to German women—the differential effects
for German and migrant women are equal to −0.322 and to −0.637 respectively—and
significantly so at the 1% level.23 This again appears to be the case for non-Christian
migrant women only (column 4): for those women, the effect of a relative wage change
(relative to their husbands) on their reported satisfaction is equal to −0.402 if they never
attend any religious events (significant at the 5% level), while it is significantly more
negative (at the 1% level) and equal to −1.311 if they attend weekly. In addition, when
focusing on women who attend religious events on a weekly basis only, non-Christian
migrant women are again significantly more adversely affected than German women by
a improvement in their relative wage—the effects are equal to −0.323 and to −1.311 for
non-migrant and migrant women respectively, and are significantly different from each
other at the 1% level.
[Table 11 here]
Table 11 addresses the role of young children (who tend to be associated with higher
rematching costs) and of the extent of the burden of household work carried by married
women. Looking at column 1, we can see that having young children does not produce
any significant difference in the impact of a relative wage increase between migrant
and non-migrant women’s well-being: the interaction between the wage share and the
number of pre-school children is positive and significant for non-migrant women, but is
not statistically different from zero for migrant women. More importantly, the implied
effects for both migrant and German women (relative to their husbands) are statistically
different from each other (at the 1% level). This is true whatever the number of young
children they have (from one to three) and even if they do not have any pre-school chil-
dren (in which case #Child 04 = 0). We are therefore unable to conclude that rematching
costs, proxied by the number of young children in the household, affect differently the
relationship between relative wages and satisfaction for German and migrant women.
In contrast, not having any family or friends around to help with household work
does seem to affect migrant and German women differently (column 2). For women
who receive daily visits from family and friends (No Visit = 1), the effects of a relative
23For women who participate in religious events on a weekly basis (Religion = 4), the differential effects
(relative to the husbands) can be calculated as (−0.210− (0.028× 4)) = −0.322 for German women and
(−0.210+ 0.076− 0.028− (0.098× 4)) = −0.637 for migrant women.
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wage increase are not statistically different between migrant and non-migrant women
(the p-value is equal to 0.17). However, the difference becomes significant once we
compare German and migrant women who do not regularly receive visits from relatives
(No Visit = 5): the effect is equal to −2.05 for migrant women, which is significantly
more negative (at the 4% level) than the corresponding effect for German women (equal
to −0.621).
Column 3 provides evidence on the role of external help in alleviating the burden of
household work. The interactions between the migrant and German female wage shares
and No Cleaner are both negative and significant. For migrant and German women
who employ external help (No Cleaner = 0), we cannot reject (at the 39% level) that
the wage share effects on reported satisfaction are equal. However, when focusing on
women who do not employ any external help (No Cleaner = 1), the calculated effect is
significantly more negative (at the 1% level) for migrant women—the effects being equal
to −0.956 for migrant women against −0.084 for German women. This indicates that
migrant women are indeed more adversely affected by the burden of household duties
than German women are.
Overall, the empirical results presented in this section indicate that, as predicted by
our theoretical model, migrant women tend to be more negatively affected by an im-
provement in their relative earning power compared to German women. The observed
difference is stronger for migrant women who are more religious, are non-Christian,
and face a heavier household burden.
5 Summary and Conclusion
If married women experience an increase in their labor market opportunities relative to
their husbands, bargaining theory suggests that they should experience comparatively
more favorable outcomes. However, economic theory also suggests that, if renegotiation
possibilities are limited, the opposite may be true: a relative improvement in labor mar-
ket opportunities for women may only induce them to exert higher market effort, with
little relief from household activities and limited compensation.
Our findings indicate that, holding everything else constant, a relative improvement
in labor market opportunities does not translate into comparatively better outcomes for
migrant wives. This is not to say that married women do not benefit from migration.
Indeed, they may benefit more from it than men do. However, if migration benefits
married women, it is not because of the comparative improvement in labor market op-
portunities that they may experience.
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As suggested by many sociological studies that have stressed the continuing rele-
vance for working women of traditional gender roles within the household, a compar-
ative improvement in labor market opportunities for women might just act to increase
their “double burden”. Traditional gender roles (a comparative advantage of wives in
childcare and other household activities) imply relative specialization in market produc-
tion by males; under limited renegotiation, this should then imply a negative own-wage
effect on a woman’s satisfaction, which increases with the extent to which household
production costs are borne by women. Working-hours constraints can also make such
negative effect much larger: labor supply responses will be more elastic for part-time
working spouses than for spouses working full-time, and gender roles imply that there
will be comparatively more women working part-time with a full-time working hus-
band (in line with evidence on aggregate labor supply elasticities across genders). Then,
a bargaining model that accounts for the presence of female specialization in household
activities and working hours constraints generates predictions that are consistent with
the above double burden conjecture.
According to our theoretical model, migrant women should be more likely to experi-
ence adverse effects following an improvement in their labor market opportunities than
German women. This could be a result of self-selection effects in the migration decision,
implying that migrant women are more likely to belong to households characterized by
low risk aversion and strong commitment. Migrant households might also be character-
ized by more traditional gender roles and by larger renegotiation and rematching costs
faced by female spouses, which make the negative effect of an own-wage improvement
more severe. Indeed, our empirical analysis shows that this negative effect is stronger
for migrant women than for German women. Such difference is larger for women of
Muslim faith and in particular for very religious Muslim women—suggesting that Is-
lamic marriages might be characterized by stricter social norms and by more traditional
gender roles for women. Our regression results also suggest that access to childcare and
domestic and family help could be crucial determinants of the migration outcomes for
women.
A limitation of our empirical analysis is that the dataset at our disposal only allows
us to test our theoretical predictions indirectly. A more direct evaluation of the impact of
relative wage changes due to migration on the utility of spouses would require informa-
tion about pre- and post-migration outcomes for individual couples. Such information
would also allow us to examine issues of marriage-related selection bias in migration
(e.g. in terms of the degree of marriage commitment and the degree of intra-household
specialization).
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Table 1: Origin of Migrant Couples in the Sample
Country of origin Number of individuals % Number of %
× number of years individuals
Poland 910 16.17 144 18.32
Ex-Yugoslavia 907 16.12 109 13.87
Russia 832 14.79 125 15.90
Turkey 785 13.95 127 16.16
Kazakhstan 680 12.08 94 11.96
Romania 395 7.02 54 6.87
Eastern Europe 377 6.70 23 2.93
Croatia 144 2.56 11 1.40
Ukraine 127 2.26 20 2.54
Bosnia-Herzegovina 89 1.58 9 1.15
Kosovo-Albania 54 0.96 10 1.27
Kyrgyzstan 37 0.66 10 1.27
Albania 36 0.64 9 1.15
Kurdistan 36 0.64 6 0.76
Bulgaria 28 0.50 3 0.38
Vietnam 24 0.43 4 0.51
Iran 23 0.41 7 0.89
Chile 22 0.39 1 0.13
Mexico 22 0.39 2 0.25
Hungary 14 0.25 3 0.38
Syria 12 0.21 1 0.13
Pakistan 12 0.21 2 0.25
Uzbekistan 12 0.21 2 0.25
Georgia 12 0.21 1 0.13
Czech Republic 10 0.18 2 0.25
Iraq 10 0.18 2 0.25
Latvia 6 0.11 1 0.13
Azerbaijan 6 0.11 1 0.13
Angola 4 0.07 2 0.25
Argentina 1 0.02 1 0.13
Total 5,627 100 786 100
Source: GSOEP.
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Table 2: Household Status of Migrants in the GSOEP
Total Male Female
Total number of migrants 9,802 4,909 4,893
Second generation 2,790 1,364 1,426
Migrated as a married couple 1,030 515 515
Migrated as a married couple (not from rich countries) 786 393 393
Migrated not as a married couple 3759 1,955 1,804
Do not know 1,437 682 755
Migrated not as a couple
Got married before migrating 1,552 721 831
Got married the year migrated 198 64 134
Single when migrated 2,009 1,170 839
Source: GSOEP.
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Table 3: List of Variables Used as Controls/Interactions
Variables Definition
Satisfaction “How satisfied are you today with your life, all things considered?”
Varies between 0 (completely dissatisfied) to 10 (completely satisfied)
Wage share (Real) hourly wage share of each spouse in household hourly wage
HH income (Real) annual household income (DM)
Fem Dummy equal to 1 for Female
Yrs education Education or training (years)
Health “How satisfied are you today with your health?”
Varies between 0 (completely dissatisfied) to 10 (completely satisfied)
Age Age of respondent (years)
Age Sq/1000 Age of respondent (years), squared/1000
#HH members Number of persons in household
Child Dummy for having children
#Children Number of children in household
#Child04 Number of children in household, aged between 0 and 4
Child010 Dummy for having children younger than 10 years of age
Religion “How often do you go to church?”
Weekly [4], Monthly [3], Less frequently [2], Never [1]
Non Christian Dummy for countries in which main religion is non-Christian
Enclave “Are there any foreign families living in your area?”
Yes, many [2], Yes, a few [1], No [0]
Flex Number of hours of work “agreed” with the employer divided by the desired number
hours of work per week
Full-time Dummy equal to 1 for switching from part-time to full-time status from one year
to the next, times the yearly growth rate of the hourly wage (positive change only)
Overtime Number of hours worked overtime per week divided by the number of hours “agreed”
with the employer
No Family “When you immigrated to Germany, was (at least) one member of your family living
in Germany?”
Yes [0], No [1]
No Visit “In your free time, how often do you visit or receive visits from family
and relatives?”
Daily [1], Weekly [2], Monthly [3], Less frequently [4], Never [5]
No Cleaner “Do you regularly or occasionally employ household help?”
Regularly or Occasionally [0] and Never [1]
Until 85/Until 91 Dummy equal to 1 until 1985/1991
Migrants Dummy equal to 1 for being a Migrant
Source: GSOEP.
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Table 4: Correlation Matrix
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(1) Satisfaction 1 – – – – – –
(2) ln Wage share 0.007 1 – – – – –
(3) ln Wage share×Fem 0.001 0.692 1 – – – –
(4) ln HH income 0.111 -0.048 0.006 1 – – –
(5) Age -0.189 0.077 0.141 0.010 1 – –
(6) Age Sq/1000 -0.193 0.077 0.138 -0.012 0.995 1 –
(7) #HH members 0.141 -0.014 -0.028 0.185 -0.411 -0.426 1
(8) Child 0.146 -0.014 0.002 0.043 -0.599 -0.601 0.663
(9) #Children 0.113 -0.015 -0.023 -0.039 -0.602 -0.595 0.766
(10) Child010 0.103 -0.007 -0.018 -0.090 -0.537 -0.507 0.489
(11) Yrs education -0.046 0.052 0.115 0.194 -0.133 -0.140 0.110
(12) Yrs education, partner -0.075 -0.127 -0.126 0.196 -0.187 -0.195 0.109
(13) Health 0.489 0.022 0.072 0.108 -0.344 -0.347 0.260
(14) Health, partner 0.379 -0.028 -0.094 0.105 -0.374 -0.378 0.263
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
(8) Child 1 – – – – – –
(9) #Children 0.803 1 – – – – –
(10) Child010 0.452 0.686 1 – – – –
(11) Yrs education 0.197 0.126 0.045 1 – – –
(12) Yrs education, partner 0.197 0.125 0.045 0.592 1 – –
(13) Health 0.260 0.250 0.204 0.037 0.018 1 –
(14) Health, partner 0.263 0.254 0.205 0.019 0.040 0.420 1
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Table 5: Descriptive Statistics for Households
German Migrant Germans - Migrants
Real annual HH income (DM) 41,936 34,394 7540
(547)
a
#HH members 3.17 3.59 −0.42
(0.03)
a
#Children 0.80 1.00 −0.19
(0.03)
a
Notes: a denotes significance at 1% level. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 7: Reported Satisfaction – Migrants
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ln Wage share −0.193
(0.053)
a 0.546
(0.132)
a 0.586
(0.116)
a 0.339
(0.118)
a 0.344
(0.118)
b 1.323
(0.168)
a 0.540
(0.122)
a 0.583
(0.134)
a
ln Wage share×Fem – −1.302
(0.177)
a −0.510
(0.092)
a −0.341
(0.203)
−0.303
(0.203)
−4.214
(0.275)
a −0.302
(0.410)
−1.342
(0.184)
a
ln Wage share×Fem×Non Christ. – – −1.414
(0.184)
a – – – – –
ln Wage share×Fem×Religion – – – −0.087
(0.022)
a 0.016
(0.034)
– – –
ln Wage share×Fem×Religion×Non Christ. – – – – −0.280
(0.044)
a – – –
ln Wage share×Fem×Enclave – – – – – −2.644
(0.394)
a – –
ln Wage share×Fem×Age – – – – – – −0.023
(0.010)
b –
ln Wage share×Fem×#Child04 – – – – – – – −0.220
(0.031)
a
Religion – – – 0.018
(0.023)
0.016
(0.023)
– – –
Enclave – – – – – −0.474
(0.047)
a – –
Age −0.467
(0.066)
a −0.465
(0.062)
a −0.493
(0.063)
a −0.592
(0.071)
a −0.598
(0.074)
a −0.272
(0.103)
b −0.501
(0.067)
a −0.474
(0.062)
a
#Child04 – – – – – – – −0.309
(0.045)
a
Child 0.120
(0.161)
0.089
(0.166)
0.099
(0.168)
0.297
(0.144)
b 0.286
(0.145)
c −0.777
(0.236)
a 0.092
(0.165)
0.052
(0.172)
#Children −0.228
(0.079)
a −0.179
(0.080)
b −0.196
(0.079)
b −0.300
(0.021)
a −0.307
(0.020)
a 0.274
(0.108)
b −0.180
(0.080)
b −0.151
(0.083)
c
ln HH income 0.406
(0.183)
b 0.505
(0.177)
a 0.515
(0.174)
a 0.753
(0.094)
a 0.699
(0.087)
a 2.567
(0.069)
a 0.518
(0.175)
a 0.480
(0.184)
b
Age Sq/1000 3.814
(0.703)
a 3.852
(0.654)
a 4.125
(0.665)
a 6.197
(0.846)
a 6.222
(0.867)
a 1.593
(1.168)
4.122
(0.698)
a 3.950
(0.665)
a
#HH members −0.066
(0.086)
−0.070
(0.084)
−0.064
(0.078)
0.120
(0.049)
b 0.120
(0.047)
b 0.119
(0.260)
−0.068
(0.083)
−0.042
(0.077)
Child010 −0.360
(0.041)
a −0.328
(0.040)
a −0.334
(0.041)
a −0.482
(0.016)
a −0.480
(0.015)
a −1.012
(0.134)
a −0.341
(0.041)
a −0.324
(0.040)
a
Yrs education 0.011
(0.008)
0.010
(0.008)
0.019
(0.007)
b −0.052
(0.011)
a −0.050
(0.011)
a −0.256
(0.029)
a 0.015
(0.008)
c 0.006
(0.008)
Yrs education, partner −0.107
(0.015)
a −0.108
(0.014)
a −0.114
(0.013)
a −0.157
(0.012)
a −0.164
(0.012)
a −0.008
(0.018)
−0.112
(0.014)
a −0.112
(0.014)
a
Health 0.203
(0.019)
a 0.196
(0.020)
a 0.194
(0.020)
a 0.247
(0.031)
a 0.247
(0.030)
a −0.002
(0.008)
0.193
(0.020)
a 0.196
(0.019)
a
Health, partner 0.043
(0.018)
b 0.035
(0.018)
c 0.032
(0.018)
c 0.042
(0.012)
a 0.038
(0.012)
a 0.358
(0.010)
a 0.035
(0.018)
c 0.035
(0.017)
b
R2 0.694 0.697 0.699 0.76 0.761 0.97 0.697 0.697
Observations 1428 1428 1428 759 759 212 1428 1428
Notes: a, b and c denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Standard errors in parentheses.
Observations are weighted using sampling weights, standard errors are adjusted for clustering across voting districts.
Individual, year and German La¨nder fixed effects are included in all cases.
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Table 8: Reported Satisfaction – Migrants
(1) (2) (3)
ln Wage share 1.323
(0.238)
a −0.300
(0.145)
b 0.195
(0.332)
ln Wage share×Fem −2.724
(0.284)
a 0.331
(0.167)
c −0.785
(0.267)
a
ln Wage share×Fem×Full-time −3.197
(0.804)
a – –
ln Wage share×Fem×Flex – −0.220
(0.121)
c –
ln Wage share×Fem×Overtime – – −0.393
(0.142)
a
Full-time −1.254
(0.542)
b – –
Flex – −0.409
(0.163)
b –
Overtime – – −0.061
(0.079)
Age −0.542
(0.131)
a −0.501
(0.083)
a −0.265
(0.057)
a
Child 0.120
(0.338)
−0.077
(0.191)
0.294
(0.032)
a
#Children −0.349
(0.231)
−0.173
(0.102)
c −0.138
(0.041)
a
ln HH income 0.233
(0.300)
0.986
(0.168)
a −0.276
(0.193)
Age Sq/1000 4.870
(1.315)
a 4.364
(0.772)
a 1.750
(0.675)
b
#HH members −0.020
(0.180)
−0.275
(0.164)
c 0.450
(0.085)
a
Child010 −0.545
(0.063)
a −0.409
(0.046)
a 0.182
(0.041)
a
Yrs education 0.035
(0.012)
a 0.016
(0.005)
a 0.006
(0.016)
Yrs education, partner −0.145
(0.014)
a −0.109
(0.014)
a −0.005
(0.010)
Health 0.201
(0.026)
a 0.172
(0.027)
a 0.152
(0.018)
a
Health, partner 0.018
(0.016)
0.041
(0.023)
c −0.045
(0.018)
b
R2 0.736 0.699 0.782
Observations 923 1180 388
Notes: See Notes to Table 7.
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Table 9: Reported Satisfaction – Migrants
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln Wage share −0.422
(0.412)
3.462
(1.153)
a 0.538
(0.137)
a 0.556
(0.131)
a 0.578
(0.118)
a
ln Wage share×Fem 1.359
(0.656)
b −2.236
(1.384)
0.987
(1.482)
−1.298
(0.178)
a −0.974
(0.248)
a
ln Wage share×Fem×No Family −2.479
(0.791)
a – – – –
ln Wage share×Fem×No Visit – −0.691
(0.196)
a – – –
ln Wage share×Fem×No Cleaner – – −2.287
(1.366)
c – –
ln Wage share×Fem×Until 85 – – – −0.229
(0.177)
–
ln Wage share×Fem×Until 91 – – – – −0.978
(0.367)
b
No Family – – – – –
No Visit – −0.412
(0.211)
c – – –
No Cleaner – – −0.518
(0.246)
b – –
Age −0.476
(0.176)
a −0.771
(0.315)
b −0.459
(0.061)
a −0.458
(0.060)
a −0.421
(0.063)
a
Child 0.244
(0.225)
−0.545
(0.212)
b 0.094
(0.167)
0.088
(0.165)
0.087
(0.168)
#Children −0.289
(0.159)
c −0.521
(0.034)
a −0.177
(0.079)
b −0.179
(0.081)
b −0.190
(0.085)
b
ln HH income 0.625
(0.388)
c 1.390
(1.398)
0.499
(0.179)
a 0.504
(0.177)
a 0.485
(0.172)
a
Age Sq/1000 4.415
(1.940)
b 6.110
(3.180)
c 3.785
(0.647)
a 3.825
(0.652)
a 3.606
(0.744)
a
#HH members −0.183
(0.215)
0.043
(0.340)
−0.069
(0.081)
−0.070
(0.084)
−0.091
(0.074)
Child010 −0.422
(0.142)
a −0.919
(0.158)
a −0.325
(0.039)
a −0.328
(0.039)
a −0.330
(0.037)
a
Yrs education −0.057
(0.054)
0.118
(0.050)
b 0.007
(0.009)
0.009
(0.008)
0.007
(0.007)
Yrs education, partner −0.124
(0.054)
b −0.080
(0.020)
a −0.105
(0.014)
a −0.108
(0.014)
a −0.105
(0.012)
a
Health 0.167
(0.042)
a 0.295
(0.059)
a 0.196
(0.020)
a 0.196
(0.020)
a 0.194
(0.021)
a
Health, partner 0.010
(0.038)
0.004
(0.023)
0.035
(0.018)
c 0.035
(0.018)
c 0.035
(0.018)
c
R2 0.731 0.947 0.698 0.697 0.701
Observations 845 286 1428 1428 1428
Notes: See Notes to Table 7.
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Table 10: Reported Satisfaction – Migrants and Germans
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln Wage share 0.047
(0.005)
a 0.047
(0.005)
a 0.050
(0.004)
a 0.051
(0.004)
a
ln Wage share×Fem −0.083
(0.004)
a −0.083
(0.005)
a −0.210
(0.003)
a −0.210
(0.003)
a
ln Wage share×Fem×Migrants −0.871
(0.057)
a −0.043
(0.090)
0.076
(0.141)
0.112
(0.137)
ln Wage share×Fem×Non Christian×Migrants – −1.351
(0.210)
a – –
ln Wage share×Fem×Religion – – −0.028
(0.003)
a −0.028
(0.003)
a
ln Wage share×Fem×Religion×Migrants – – −0.098
(0.027)
a 0.006
(0.036)
ln Wage share×Fem×Religion×Non Christian×Migrants – – – −0.275
(0.047)
a
Religion – – 0.011
(0.004)
b 0.011
(0.004)
b
Age −0.055
(0.001)
a −0.056
(0.002)
a −0.166
(0.002)
a −0.166
(0.002)
a
Child 0.047
(0.010)
a 0.049
(0.010)
a 0.057
(0.021)
b 0.056
(0.021)
b
#Children −0.048
(0.003)
a −0.049
(0.003)
a −0.080
(0.001)
a −0.081
(0.001)
a
ln HH income 0.283
(0.010)
a 0.282
(0.010)
a 0.269
(0.011)
a 0.266
(0.011)
a
Age Sq/1000 0.186
(0.026)
a 0.194
(0.027)
a 1.336
(0.019)
a 1.337
(0.019)
a
#HH members −0.106
(0.008)
a −0.105
(0.008)
a 0.016
(0.010)
0.016
(0.010)
Child010 0.045
(0.002)
a 0.045
(0.002)
a 0.066
(0.001)
a 0.066
(0.001)
a
Yrs education 0.025
(0.005)
a 0.027
(0.005)
a −0.011
(0.006)
c −0.011
(0.006)
Yrs education, partner −0.060
(0.007)
a −0.062
(0.008)
a −0.069
(0.010)
a −0.072
(0.010)
a
Health 0.188
(0.002)
a 0.188
(0.002)
a 0.201
(0.005)
a 0.201
(0.005)
a
Health, partner 0.068
(0.001)
a 0.068
(0.001)
a 0.045
(0.002)
a 0.044
(0.002)
a
R2 0.619 0.619 0.717 0.717
Observations 14487 14487 6520 6520
Notes: See Notes to Table 7.
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Table 11: Reported Satisfaction – Migrants and Germans
(1) (2) (3)
ln Wage share 0.043
(0.005)
a 0.265
(0.019)
a 0.046
(0.005)
a
ln Wage share×Fem −0.077
(0.004)
a −0.851
(0.048)
a −0.015
(0.005)
a
ln Wage share×Fem×Migrants −0.878
(0.059)
a −0.629
(0.763)
0.743
(0.860)
ln Wage share×Fem×#Child04 0.004
(0.001)
a – –
ln Wage share×Fem×#Child04×Migrants 0.002
(0.037)
– –
ln Wage share×Fem×No Visit – 0.046
(0.012)
a –
ln Wage share×Fem×No Visit×Migrants – −0.160
(0.255)
–
ln Wage share×Fem×No Cleaner – – −0.068
(0.001)
a
ln Wage share×Fem×No Cleaner×Migrants – – −1.615
(0.883)
c
#Child04 −0.062
(0.002)
a – –
No Visit – 0.036
(0.012)
–
No Cleaner – – −0.073
(0.001)
a
Age −0.060
(0.001)
a −0.101
(0.018)
−0.055
(0.001)
a
Child 0.052
(0.010)
a 0.178
(0.022)
0.048
(0.010)
a
#Children −0.051
(0.003)
a −0.117
(0.016)
a −0.048
(0.003)
a
ln HH income 0.278
(0.010)
a 0.073
(0.045)
a 0.283
(0.010)
a
Age Sq/1000 0.236
(0.026)
a 0.644
(0.208)
a 0.178
(0.026)
a
#HH members −0.097
(0.007)
a −0.142
(0.085)
a −0.106
(0.008)
a
Child010 0.059
(0.002)
a 0.127
(0.006)
a 0.045
(0.002)
a
Yrs education 0.025
(0.005)
a 0.031
(0.002)
a 0.025
(0.005)
a
Yrs education, partner −0.060
(0.007)
a −0.159
(0.005)
a −0.059
(0.007)
a
Health 0.189
(0.002)
a 0.142
(0.009)
a 0.188
(0.002)
a
Health, partner 0.068
(0.001)
a 0.044
(0.005)
a 0.068
(0.001)
a
R2 0.619 0.89 0.619
Observations 14487 2425 14487
Notes: See Notes to Table 7.
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